Weltanschauung, Weltbild, or Weltauffassung?Stein on the Significance of Husserl’s Way of Looking at the WorldGeorge HeffernanOnline Conference: Stein’s and Husserl’s Intertwined Itineraries 1916–25: With Focus on Ideas IIIn Cooperation with the Center for the History of Women Philosophers and ScientistsUniversity of PaderbornMay 20–21, 2021Abstract In her doctoral dissertation, Zum Problem der Einfühlung (1916), Stein attempted tocomplement Husserl’s work on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity by providing a description ofempathy and its key role in the mutual constitution of whole persons. Because he thought that her workanticipated certain ideas from the second part of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie undphänomenologischen Philosophie, Husserl demurred at publishing it in his Jahrbuch für Philosophieund phänomenologische Forschung. He did, however, engage Stein as his private assistant, and as suchshe helped him edit, between 1916 and 1918, his Ideas II. In the process, Stein’s interventions may haveintroduced views different from and possibly foreign to Husserl’s, and the new Husserliana edition ofIdeas IV/V (2021) aims to sort things out. This paper seeks to contextualize the debate about thephilosophical relationship between Stein and Husserl between 1916 and 1925 by drawing on two othersets of texts: (1) Stein’s several contributions to understanding Husserl’s transcendental phenomenologyfrom 1924 to 1937, for example, “Die weltanschauliche Bedeutung der Phänomenologie” (1930/31); and(2) Husserl’s “Fichte Lectures” (1917/18), his “Kaizo Articles” (1922–24), and his “Reflections onEthics from the Freiburg Years” (1916–37). The results of the paper suggest that, as Husserl did notadequately appreciate Stein’s pioneering work on the phenomenology of the person, she also did notfully recognize the philosophical potential of his transcendental-idealist Weltanschauung for clarifyingsocial phenomena. Thus their itineraries were intertwined but not inextricably so.Preface: Reconstituting the phenomenology of the constitution of the socialFormally, Husserl’s Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book:Phenomenological Investigations of Constitution and Theory of Science is intended to continue the workof his Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book: GeneralIntroduction to Pure Phenomenology (Hua III/1, 7). Materially, it is supposed to so by focusing on therelationships between the pure I and the real I, psychic reality and material reality, the soul and the livebody, material things and the live body, and solipsistic and intersubjective experience—in short, spirit,nature, and person. Methodologically, these phenomena are investigated under the aspect of theirconstitution in and by consciousness.According to the editor of the new Husserliana edition of Ideen II, Dirk Fonfara, one shoulddistinguish five stages in the Entstehungs- und Entwicklungsgeschichte of the work (Hua IV/V, xxxiii–xxix). First, Husserl produced three partial drafts of the second book of Ideen in 1912, 1913, and 1915.Second, he also generated, between 1908 and 1924, texts that are thematically related to Ideen II, andStein, as his private assistant, used parts of some of these texts, research manuscripts selected by him, tocompose a unified handscript between 1916 and 1918. Third, Ludwig Landgrebe, as his private

Heffernan: Stein on Husserl’s Weltanschauung/2assistant, produced for Husserl, in 1924/25, a typescript of the handscript of Stein, and Husserl, between1924/25 and 1928, entered numerous corrections, notations, and supplementations into this version.Fourth, Marly Biemel produced, for volumes IV and V of Husserliana in 1952, an edition of Ideen IIthat incorporated Husserl’s emendations into Landgrebe’s typescript of Stein’s handscript. Fifth, Fonfarahas produced an edition of Ideen II for the Husserliana that reconstructs, as far as it is retrievable, theform and content that Husserl would have given his texts.Before the new Husserliana edition of Ideen II it was already know that Stein was not fulfilled byworking with Husserl (ESGA 2, 23; 4, 50–1, 72–4). But the new edition presents evidence that Husserlwas also dissatisfied with Stein’s attempts by her interventions to become a kind of co-author of Ideen II(Hua IV/V, xxvii, ns. 2–3). He also reacted critically to the typescript produced by Landgrebe based onthe handscript made by Stein (Hua IV/V, xxvii, n. 3; xxviii, n. 1–xxix, n. 1). In many places Husserldemanded a return to his original manuscripts. In any case, Husserl eventually broke off his attempts towork with Stein’s and Landgrebe’s versions of his manuscripts for Ideen II, so that there is no reason toregard the version that emerged by 1928 as bearing his imprimatur. This version served, however, as thesupposedly authorized text of Ideen II that was published in the Husserliana in 1952.Thanks to the painstaking editorial efforts at the Husserl Archives, one can now say that what haslong been a theoretical necessity has emerged as a practical possibility, namely, the task of clarifyingStein’s and Husserl’s respective contributions to Ideas II and of situating them within the field of thephenomenology of the social, to which both thinkers made several substantial contributions between1917 and 1925. Husserl did so with his “Fichte Lectures” (1917/18) on the ideal of humanity, his “KaizoArticles” on cultural renewal (1922–24), and his “Reflections on Ethics from the Freiburg Years”(1916–37), and Stein did as well with her treatises Psychic Causality (1922), Individual and Community(1922), and An Investigation concerning the State (1925), which appeared in the Jahrbuch fürPhilosophie und phänomenologische Forschung.Within this horizon, the task of the conference is to discuss the contributions of Husserl and Stein toIdeas II in the light of their contributions to social phenomenology from 1917 to 1925 and beyond. Thisis important work because it remains desirable not only to arrive at a judicious assessment of the work ofthese philosophers, but also to advance the field of social phenomenology, which has significantinterdisciplinary relevance for other disciplines, especially the social sciences and political science.The present paper stretches the conference horizon by casting a wide temporal and thematic net topose the question concerning the extent to which Stein and Husserl understood one another’s generalphilosophical-phenomenological approaches—in a word, their respective Weltanschauungen(worldviews). In “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (1911) Husserl defines phenomenology as rigorousscience in opposition to philosophy as Weltanschauungsphilosophie (Hua XXV, 3–62). In “TheSignificance of Phenomenology for a Worldview” (1930/31), however, Stein insists not only on therelevance of phenomenology for the formation of a worldview but also on the significance of a Weltbild(world picture) for the phenomenologist (ESGA 9, 143–158). In his research manuscripts, Husserlmakes the distinction between a Weltanschauung and a Weltauffassung (world apprehension) (e.g., HuaXLII, 204–11, 332, 404). This philosophical difference, which lies at the foundation of thephenomenology of the constitution of the social world, yields the clue to the present approach. It wouldbe hard to imagine a more promising occasion on which to revisit the philosophical relationship betweenStein and Husserl than the publication of the new Husserliana edition of Ideen II.

Heffernan: Stein on Husserl’s Weltanschauung/3Talking points1. Introduction: A relationship fraught from the start?1.1. The development of Husserl’s phenomenology between 1900/01 and 1913/151.1.1. Logical Investigations (1900/01) call for realism: “to the things themselves” (Hua XIX/1, 10)1.1.2. Idea of Phenomenology (1907) introduces phenomenological method of transcendental reduction (Hua II)1.1.3. Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology I (1913) announces idealism: “consciousness constitutes being” (Hua III/1)1.2. Like other students (Reinach etc.), Stein has a critical reaction to Husserl’s methodological reorientation (1913–15)1.2.1. She comes to Göttingen to study with the author of Investigations (ESGA 1, 199–200)1.2.2. She encounters the author of Ideas (ESGA 1, 200): ‘no consciousness, no world’ (ESGA 9, 89)1.2.3. They engage in lively discussions & passionate debates about transcendental idealism (ESGA 1, 200–01)1.3. Stein submits her dissertation On the Problem of Empathy in Freiburg, where Husserl had moved (1916)1.3.1. Stein passes her exam rigorosum (3.VIII.1916) with the grade of summa cum laude (ESGA 1, 341–3)1.3.2. But Husserl does not publish her dissertation in his Jahrbuch (ESGA 1, 340) According to her, he does not want to publish it next to Ideas II there because he thinks that it “anticipates some things” from that forthcoming work1.3.3. Stein publishes her dissertation as a book (1917) but without the historical part, which is now lost1.4. Before her Promotion, Stein offers to serve Husserl as his private assistant, and he accepts (ESGA 1, 339–40)1.4.1. One of her tasks is helping edit his Ideas II, but it is hard for her to please him (Hua IV/V, xxvii, ns. 2–3)1.4.2. He regards her as an editorial assistant, whereas she sees herself as a philosophical associate1.4.2.1. Their relationship does not yield “a real cooperation” (ESGA 2, 23 [12.I.1917]) Stein works on manuscripts that Husserl does not look at (ESGA 4, 50–51 [20.III.1917]) She can “serve” a “cause”, but not a “human being”: “obey, that I cannot” (ESGA 4, 72–3 [19.II.1918]) Stein pours herself out to Ingarden and quits Husserl’s service (ESGA 4, 74 [28.II.1918])1.4.3. Husserl did not much favor women in the academy, and this hurt Stein’s prospects for Habilitation1.4.3.1. Husserl’s evaluation of Stein’s dissertation (29.VII.1916) (BW III, 548) Husserl’s letter of recommendation for Stein (6.II.1919) (BW III, 548–9) Prussian Decree on the Admission of Women to University Study permitted female Habilitation (1908) Stein had to press the issue to final clarification (ESGA 2, 50–2, 56 [12.XII.1919, 21.II.1920]) She made repeated attempts but was never able to achieve Habilitation (Knaup & Seubert 2017, 13)1.5. A question of empathy: Did Stein and Husserl ever genuinely understand one another philosophically?1.5.1. The question concerns their respective understandings of the general relationship between mind and world1.5.2. It also concerns their respective understandings of particular relationships in the phenomenology of the social1.5.2.1. The constitution of the self as a whole person consisting of body, soul, and spirit (ESGA 5) The constitution of others as whole persons (cf. ESGA 5, 107, e.g., self-deception & other-correction) The constitution of God & the relationship between God & human beings (ESGA 5, 20, 67) These phenomena involve questions of evidence or givenness: Gegebenheit (ESGA 5, 126–7 etc. )1.6. The new edition of Ideas II makes an indispensable contribution to the resolution of these & related issues2. Elaboration: Stein’s distance from and critique of Husserl’s transcendental-idealist worldview2.1. Stein’s academic career & spiritual journey leave her little chance to philosophize with Husserl after 19182.1.1. She receives Roman Catholic baptism in Bergzabern (1.I.1922) and confirmation in Speyer (2.II.1922)2.1.2. She teaches at the Lyceum & Seminary of the Dominican Sisters in St. Magdalena, Speyer (1922–32)2.1.3. She lectures at the German Institute for Scientific Pedagogy in Münster until “Arierparagraph” (1932–33)2.1.4. She enters the Cologne Carmel in successive stages of her profession of vows (1933/34/38)2.1.5. The exceptions prove the rule2.1.5.1. Sporadic correspondence: 10.IX.1929; 17.VII.1931 (BW III, 547 & ESGA 2, 101–02; ESGA 2, 185–7) Personal encounters: 1926 (ESGA 4, 171–2 [9.X.1926]), 8.IV.1929 (Festschrift-Feier for Husserl) Confirmation: ‘[Stein] has not spoken to [Husserl] in several years’ (ESGA 9, 89 [1924])2.2. Stein undergoes not only a religious conversion but also a philosophical conversion in the 1920/30s2.2.1. She continues to struggle with Husserl’s transcendental idealism2.2.2. She translates Aquinas’ Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (started in 1925 and published in 1931/32)2.2.3. Gradually Stein comes to prefer Thomistic realism over Husserlian idealism as a way of looking at the world2.2.4. Her shift is documented in her correspondence with Ingarden (ESGA 4; Heffernan 2021a, 141–2)2.3. Stein’s reorientation away from Husserl and toward Aquinas is reflected in her writings on phenomenology2.3.1. “What is Phenomenology?” (1924) (ESGA 9, 85–90)

Heffernan: Stein on Husserl’s Weltanschauung/ Stein emphasizes history, method, knowledge, intuition, & idealism of Husserl’s philosophy2.3.1.2. She downplays his idealism & recommends the works of his realistically inclined students2.3.1.3. Stein makes no mention of Husserl’s investigations in the phenomenology of the social2.3.2. “Husserls Phenomenology and the Philosophy of St. Thomas of Aquinas” (1929) (ESGA 9, 119–42) Stein composes a juxtaposition of Husserlian idealism and Thomistic realism2.3.2.2. She argues that Husserl’s turn toward TI has led phenomenology away from medieval philosophy2.3.3. “The Significance of Phenomenology for a Worldview” (1930/31) (ESGA 9, 143–58) At the beginning, Stein distinguishes between the “religious worldview” and the “scientific worldview” Stein does not mention Dilthey’s work (1911) or Jaspers’s Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (1919) She does mention H’s “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (1911) (Hua XXV, 3–62) She mentions Scheler & Heidegger but emphasizes Husserl for his influence & transcendental idealism2.3.3.5. She argues that phenomenology influences wo